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Volume 4 Number 13 June
2, 2006 |
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Left for dead Do we have an ethical obligation to render
assistance to others? There's been a lot of buzzing in the blogosphere lately about recent events on Mt. Everest, where one person died and another almost died, while other climbers trekked by them to reach the summit. The person who almost died was declared dead and was later revived, despite having spent the night in frigid temperatures. The whole episode has led to a bout of pseudo-ethical ranting on the Web, with a lot of heat and very little light. Mostly it consists of broad, sweeping statement and some unwarranted name-calling and denigration of mountain climbers. The hyper-reaction, while expected, is unfortunate, because the situation does raise some important ethical questions that have very broad implications in a lot of other areas. Among the questions it raises are:
The existence of an obligation to render mutual assistance seems to be the easiest to establish. I think that at some level most people believe in an obligation to help people in distress. I've heard people try to deny it, but I've never heard anyone defend that position successfully. Suppose Hector is leaving for work one morning and as he leaves the driveway, he sees his neighbor lying face down on the lawn. Now, unless this is a common occurrence, he would most likely stop to offer some assistance, and most people would say bad things about him if he didn't. The fact that he would receive nearly universal disapproval for his failure to act is a clue that most moral systems, whether consequentialist or deontological, would reach the conclusion that such aid is a moral requirement. But, let's raise the ante a
little bit. He sees his neighbor in the front yard. Suddenly, the neighbor
clutches his chest and falls to the ground. Hector, being trained in CPR,
knows that something is dreadfully wrong. Now, most people would say,
Hector's obligation is stronger. He must do more than call But what if Hector has his own priorities at the moment? He's not leaving for work, but rather leaving to take his critically ill child to the emergency room. Must he delay his own trip with his dying child in order to administer CPR to his dying neighbor? I think most people would agree to resolve he dilemma in favor of Hector's child, and you could reach to conclusion in different ways from a variety of ethical theories. Deontologists could argue that while Hector does have an obligation to the neighbor, he also has one to his child, and that the obligation to the child is stronger. Consequentialists could argue that while the obligations to save each of the two lives cancel each other out, the world is a better place because of parents caring for their children. So far, we have two polar
examples about which our intuitions -- or at least the intuitions of many
people -- are quite clear. In the first case, Hector is morally required to
assist the neighbor. In the second, he is morally required to attend to his
child, despite the neighbor's plight. This doesn't mean that in the second
case Hector doesn't try to get some aid for the neighbor, perhaps by calling As in many cases, however, the polar examples don't give us the answers we need for the more common, and harder, cases in which the proportion between the outcomes isn’t so clear. Suppose instead of taking his child to the hospital, Hector is already running late for his train. If he misses it, the next one is in an hour -- and he will miss the important meeting with his company’s major clients, who will be meeting with his biggest competitor this afternoon. If he misses the train, he could lose the contract, and could probably be fired. If he stops to administer CPR, he will miss the train. What is his obligation to the neighbor? Someone could complain that the contract is a chancy affair to begin with. Maybe his company will get it and may the competitor will get it. No one knows, but we do know that the neighbor's situation is real, and we need to deal with that. I'm not sure it's a convincing argument, but someone could reasonably make it. So, let's make the situation
a sure thing. Hector discovers a lottery ticket in an old suit. He has won
$100,000, but he needs to appear at the lottery office by Some might still be inclined to give priority to the neighbor's need, but I think we've reached the point where those who hold that position bear some burden. They must provide a mechanism for determining at what point we are morally required to abandon our own goals to assist those in need, even when they are in dire need. For those who think they have an answer, let me throw a little monkey wrench into the gears. How does that obligation hold up when the person in need has contributed to his or her own plight? Does that change the calculus? Suppose Hector is on his way to the lottery office, figuring he'll make it just before closing. A jerk in a hot rod passes him on the right, and Hector notices him drinking a can of beer. The guy weaves in and out of traffic, going way too fast for the road conditions. Finally Hector comes around a bend and sees the car overturned alongside the road, with the driver lying motionless on the ground. Does Hector now have an obligation to stop and render aid? How about if the lottery prize were $1 million? $10 million? Would it make a difference if there were other people on the road or not? I wish I had easy answers to these questions, but I think the fact that I don't shows that a lot of the ranting and raving about the Everest situation is ill-founded. Except in some very extreme situations, we just don't have a mechanism for deciding when we must abandon our own important goals to aid others, although it's generally believed that we have a strong obligation to provide aid in dire situations. The Everest situation has all of the elements I have included in the examples above. Those trying to reach the top had set out on a goal that required a tremendous amount of resources, both in money and time. Stopping to help someone in need would frustrate their goal and waste a considerable amount of money. The climbers in distress went into the enterprise knowing that it was a dangerous operation. In fact, that's precisely the point of climbing Everest. Otherwise, it's not worth the effort. They knew the risks. Should their risk taking be allowed to frustrate the goals of the other climbers? At the same time, there is something about just passing by someone in distress that doesn't sit well with many of us. If you want to say either that the climbers were right or they were wrong, you would need to formulate a rule or principle and then test it against other real world examples to see whether it holds. An outside-the-box solution would be for the record keepers to recognize only the teams that make the top. After all, no one climbs Everest alone, even if there is only one person who plants the flag. In order to get recognition, all members of the team would need to survive. That might give the other climbers a little more incentive to not abandon the weak. It might also make them a little pickier in who they choose to accompany them. But that doesn’t solve the problem on the table. |
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© Copyright 2006 Carlton Vogt |